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A cornerstone of First Amendment doctrine is that counterspeech — speech that 
responds to speech, including disfavored, unpopular, or offensive speech — is 
preferable to government censorship or speech regulation. The counterspeech doctrine 
is often invoked to justify overturning or limiting legislation, regulation, or other 
government action. Counterspeech forms part of the rationale for the “marketplace of 
ideas” that the First Amendment is arguably designed to promote. Yet critics assert 
that counterspeech is hardly an effective remedy for the harms caused by “hate 
speech” and other offensive words that are expressed in American society, given the 
realities of how speech is expressed. While increases in speech may be beneficial, 
limits on attention, structural inequalities, and the chilling effects that hate speech can 
create for counterspeakers can inhibit effective counterspeech from thriving. 
This Article examines the evolution of the counterspeech doctrine throughout the 
20th and 21st centuries and how academics, advocates, and the public have engaged 
with its premises and arguments since its popularization in First Amendment doctrine. 
It argues that the shifting justifications for counterspeech and the lack of clarity 
regarding its dynamics and defenses explains the growing criticisms and 
disapprobation of the doctrine. Yet counterspeech is also one of the most settled free 
speech doctrines — so much so that it has influence beyond the bounds of First 
Amendment-covered entities. 
The Article begins by discussing how the Supreme Court initially formulated 
counterspeech in relation to its philosophical origins, and its development and 
evolution into a core doctrinal tenet. The Article then analyzes critiques of 
counterspeech that have proliferated as it has ascended to doctrinal permanence. The 
Article concludes by evaluating how counterspeech has become central to speech 
regulation in venues that are not subject to the First Amendment, and how our 
understanding of counterspeech should shift away from treating it as a cure-all to 
disfavored speech.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Cancel culture” — a vague term that describes a milieu in which individuals with 
“problematic” views are “cancelled” like a television show with bad ratings and worse 
reviews — has hit the mainstream. In August 2020, The New York Times’s popular 
podcast “The Daily” ran a two-part series that devoted over an hour to the topic.1 That 
series was spurred in part by a high-profile letter that appeared the previous month in 
Harper’s Magazine.2 
 
1 The Daily, Cancel Culture, Part I: Where It Came From (Aug. 10, 2020) [hereinafter The 
Daily, Cancel Culture Part I: Where It Came From], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/podcasts/the-daily/cancel-culture.html 
[https://perma.cc/CJZ6-6AK2]; The Daily, Cancel Culture, Part II: A Case Study (Aug. 11, 
2020) [hereinafter The Daily, Cancel Culture, Part II: A Case Study], 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/podcasts/the-daily/cancel-culture.html 
[https://perma.cc/A5D7-KGYH]. 
2 A Letter on Justice and Open Debate, HARPER’S (July 7, 2020) [hereinafter Harper’s Letter], 
https://harpers.org/a-letter-on-justice-and-open-debate/ [https://perma.cc/X59P-B2MW]. Over 
150 writers and public intellectuals argued that individuals were under increasing pressure to 
conform to certain norms when expressing controversial opinions or risk professional or personal 
consequences. The letter endorsed counterspeech, rather than silencing, as the best method to 
combat bad ideas. (“[I]t is now all too common to hear calls for swift and severe retribution in 
response to perceived transgressions of speech and thought . . . . The way to defeat bad ideas is 
by exposure, argument, and persuasion, not by trying to silence or wish them away.”). The letter 
was the subject of much criticism. See Jennifer Schuessler & Elizabeth A. Harris, Artists and 
Writers Warn of an ‘Intolerant Climate.’ Reaction Is Swift., N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2020), 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/5
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As The Daily acknowledged, “cancel culture” is so general a term as to be nearly 
meaningless. It seems to describe critiques of individuals whose comments or actions 
seem to violate commonly-held beliefs or norms — particularly beliefs held by the 
political left.3 The Harper’s letter argued that this “censoriousness” was a problem. 
The signatories argued that, while they upheld “the value of robust and even caustic 
counter-speech from all quarters” it has become “all too common to hear calls for swift 
and severe retribution in response to perceived transgressions of speech and thought.”4 
But it is quite challenging to separate “caustic counter-speech” from retribution. 
Indeed, critics of the Harper’s letter noted just that.5 If someone is ostracized for 
unpopular views, is it punishment or justice? Both? Neither? Disagreement over terms 
— including what counts as counterspeech and what counts as unwarranted 
“cancellation” — has led to confusion and frustration over what the actual problems 
are, whether they are new problems, and what should be done to address them.6 
It’s partially for these reasons that counterspeech has both a popularity problem 
and a definitional problem. What is counterspeech? The term itself describes speech 
that counters existing speech; more broadly, theorists generally use it to describe the 
range of responses, critiques, rebuttals, and disapproval that occurs after disfavored, 
unpopular, offensive, or hateful speech is uttered.7 But curiously, those who laud 
counterspeech (and those who critique it) rarely define what counterspeech is. The 
term seems to only exist as a negative term in response to disfavored speech, and those 
who invoke it as a solution to “bad speech” generally rely upon a nearly 100-year-old 
U.S. Supreme Court decision to justify doing so.8 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/07/arts/harpers-letter.html [https://perma.cc/5N59-H9YU] 
(describing the letter and critiques). 
3 See The Daily, Cancel Culture Part I: Where It Came From, supra note 1. 
4 Harper’s Letter, supra note 2. 
5 Multiple critiques of the Harper’s letter followed, including a counterletter asserting that the 
signatories of the Harper’s letter were uncomfortable about being held accountable for their 
potentially unpopular views and that many of the dynamics they critiqued actually fell within the 
category of counterspeech. See A More Specific Letter on Justice and Open Debate, OBJECTIVE 
(July 10, 2020), https://theobjective.substack.com/p/a-more-specific-letter-on-justice 
[https://perma.cc/5SY7-QMCS]; Jennifer Schuessler, An Open Letter on Free Expression Draws 
a Counterblast, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/10/arts/open-
letter-debate.html [https://perma.cc/H2VM-HFKC] (describing the counterletter and additional 
critiques of the Harper’s letter). 
6 The discussion on The Daily noted this, analogizing “cancel culture” to the similarly broad and 
underspecified term “political correctness.” See The Daily, Cancel Culture, Part II: A Case 
Study, supra note 1. 
7 See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE SPEECH, NOT 
CENSORSHIP 128–32 (2018) (discussing “The Importance of Counterspeech” but not providing a 
definition of the term beyond contrasting it favorably against hate speech regulation). 
8 In a related venue, Heidi Kitrosser has observed what she deems the “imprecision 
throughout the public discourse” regarding “political correctness.” Because “free speech 
politics,” as Kitrosser describes them, are powerful and pervasive in American political 
discourse, they deserve attention even though they may not implicate judicial decision making. 
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Counterspeech’s longstanding service in American free speech jurisprudence 
began with Justice Louis Brandeis’s stirring concurrence in Whitney v. California,9 
where he asserted: “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is 
more speech, not enforced silence.”10 Despite counterspeech’s subsequent 
incorporation as a main component of the Courts’ current perspective on the First 
Amendment, the current controversies regarding unpopular speech demonstrate 
ambivalence, if not hostility, to counterspeech from some corners of American 
society.11  
While some of these issues stem from the regulation of speech by private 
companies and universities, to which the First Amendment does not apply, those 
entities tend to apply an American ideal of free speech to govern their own content 
decisions.12 And as a result, counterspeech and its cousin concept, “the marketplace 
of ideas,” face criticism in an era when a hands-off approach to speech regulation 
seems, for some Americans, somewhat blind to the negative consequences that can 
readily flow from unpopular speech.13 If counterspeech is to be exported to new 
 
See Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
1987, 1992–93 (2017). 
9 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372–80 (1927). 
10 Id. at 377. 
11 For example, the signatories of the Harper’s letter are inveighing against a form of 
counterspeech and, more broadly, tenets of liberalism. See Osita Nwanevu, The Willful Blindness 
of Reactionary Liberalism, NEW REPUBLIC: SOAPBOX (July 6, 2020), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/158346/willful-blindness-reactionary-liberalism 
[https://perma.cc/QF2L-5PEX] (arguing “[t]he tensions we’ve seen lately have been internal to 
liberalism for ages: between those who take the associative nature of liberal society seriously and 
those who are determined not to. It is the former group, the defenders of progressive identity 
politics, who in fact are protecting—indeed expanding—the bounds of liberalism. And it is the 
latter group, the reactionaries, who are most guilty of the illiberalism they claim has overtaken the 
American Left.”). Those who advocate for hate speech regulation also demonstrate a skepticism 
that the marketplace of ideas can function effectively to allow counterspeech to successfully 
combat racist, offensive, or disfavored speech. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers 
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 467–72 (1990). 
12 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1617–25 (2018); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, 
FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 111–13 (2017) (arguing that principles protecting free speech should 
apply to both private and public colleges and universities). 
13 See, e.g., Emily Stewart, “We Don’t Want to be Knee-jerk”: YouTube Responds to Vox on its 
Harassment Policies, Vox (Jun. 10, 2019, 6:54 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/6/10/18660364/vox-youtube-code-conference-susan-
wojcicki-carlos-maza [https://perma.cc/89WN-NAM5]. For discussion of the “libertarian” turn 
in First Amendment law, see, for example, Julie Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2015) (discussing how free speech jurisprudence has become “a 
body of doctrine robbed of its animating spirit of expressive quality and enslaved in the service 
of economic power”); Jedidiah Purdy, Beyond the Bosses’ Constitution: The First Amendment 
and Class Retrenchment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2161 (2018) (describing how the trends in First 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/5
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venues, this Article argues, those who choose to incorporate counterspeech into their 
content management policies should at least grapple with the doctrine’s complicated 
history and the critiques of its assumptions.  
Despite these critiques, counterspeech remains the preferred remedy for “the 
speech we hate” in American law.14 Courts consistently ratify it as a far superior 
solution to government regulation of speech, even speech that is offensive or hateful.15 
But because the justifications for counterspeech frequently rely upon the maxim that 
“the only cure for bad speech is more speech” — which can sound impossibly 
reductive to those unpersuaded by the argument — it is not obvious to those unaware 
of the history of free speech jurisprudence why counterspeech is preferred.16  
Current descriptions and understanding of counterspeech create additional 
complications. First, the justifications for our current free speech regime have shifted 
since the days of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Their early writings, which provide 
the basis for the modern understanding of the First Amendment, focus on the need for 
robust public debate in order to ascertain truth.17 Yet, the contemporary preference for 
counterspeech is based less on a search for truth and more on the structural, political, 
and practical problems that government regulation of speech entails.18 
Additionally, the dynamics of speech have also changed in the century since 
Justices Holmes and Brandeis first formulated their views on the First Amendment. 
While it is important to avoid technology exceptionalism by claiming that new 
technologies create unprecedented problems, digital technology has changed the 
dynamics of speech in American society, particularly with respect to volume and 
 
Amendment law retrench political power within a small group of elites by translating unequal 
wealth into unequal political power). 
14 See, e.g., United States. v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727 (2012) (“The remedy for speech that is 
false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the 
unreasoned is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straightout lie, the simple 
truth.”). 
15 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–61 (2011). 
16 Fred Schauer has described how the First Amendment’s protections flow from skepticism of 
government power and the distrust of state decisionmakers. See Frederick Schauer, The Second 
Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1989). This careful examination 
though, rarely comes through in judicial decisions interpreting First Amendment goals. 
17 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 
377 (1927). 
18 Critiques of the trends in First Amendment decisions highlight a related, broader point — that 
the doctrine as a whole seeks to protect those in power rather than actually foster debate amongst 
the population at large. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 13, at 2162 (“Although the Supreme Court’s 
‘weaponiz[ed]’ First Amendment often comes dressed in rhetoric associating political and civic 
life with an idealized market, it is aimed less at advancing a perfect market than at impeding very 
imperfect politics. It aims centrally at averting partisan and bureaucratic entrenchment—at 
preventing political elites from picking future winners from among candidates, parties, and 
policies. The problem is that, even if it accomplishes this . . . it does so at the cost of supporting 
class entrenchment: the concentration of political power in a relatively small and privileged 
echelon of Americans. It does so by constitutionally protecting the translation of unequal wealth 
into unequal political power.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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virality. Finally, courts and commentators have a propensity to speak imprecisely 
when analyzing counterspeech and the marketplace of ideas. While these two concepts 
are related, they are distinct. Yet, the relationship between the two is not always crisply 
drawn by the courts, leading to misapprehension by the public of what exactly the First 
Amendment does — and what it doesn’t do. Even though counterspeech is one of the 
most settled components of First Amendment doctrine, its transfer to non-First 
Amendment venues means that the criticisms that many level at the doctrine’s 
assumptions are relevant even if courts fail to adapt the doctrine. 
Why does it matter that counterspeech is so heavily criticized? Constitutional law, 
after all, generally isn’t subject to modification or reversal by the public. Many 
doctrinal areas, particularly in free speech law, are the subject of critiques by 
individual citizens, academics, and politicians.19 Those critiques don’t necessarily 
mean the doctrine should change in response; indeed, stare decisis might counsel 
against such reactivity.  
There are a few reasons that critiques of counterspeech matter. First, many of these 
critiques are longstanding in academic circles, though they have proliferated to the 
larger public in recent years.20 Second, the amount of speech that is produced, 
responded to, and (un)regulated has increased dramatically in an age of digital, 
networked communication. The viability of counterspeech as a remedy to disfavored 
speech is thus easier to observe and also easier to criticize. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, counterspeech and related First Amendment doctrines are expanding 
their reach beyond the courts. Non-First Amendment covered entities, like social 
media companies and private universities, often use counterspeech as justifications for 
their own speech regulations, even though they are not required to do so. As 
counterspeech extends its influence, understanding its strengths and weaknesses 
remains a vital endeavor.  
This Article engages with the intellectual history of counterspeech in the United 
States in order to highlight some of the current controversies over speech regulation, 
which are relevant to both courts and to entities not covered by the First Amendment 
that use First Amendment doctrines as guiding principles. It argues that, due to the 
issues described above with how we conceive of and discuss counterspeech, it is no 
surprise that the public has serious qualms about the efficacy and primacy of 
counterspeech in free speech jurisprudence. Even if courts decline to address those 
qualms, the private entities that use counterspeech as an element of their speech 
regulation policies should consider how to respond to contemporary critiques of the 
doctrine. 
 
19 Commercial speech regulation and the Citizens United decision are two obvious examples, 
but even other doctrinal areas like antitrust and voting rights face similar critiques from the public 
at large. See Kara Swisher, Here Come the 4 Horsemen of the Techopolypse, N.Y. TIMES (July 
1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/opinion/anti-trust-tech-hearing-facebook.html 
[https://perma.cc/B9E8-UD3N] (describing Congressional hearings into the dominance of large 
technology companies and a reappraisal of federal antitrust policies); Talmon Joseph Smith, 
Opinion, Legalized Bribery by Elites Is Here to Stay. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/25/opinion/citizens-united-2020-spending.html 
[https://perma.cc/235C-Q3AY] (criticizing the ten-year-old decision in Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission, which “opened a floodgate for wealthy donors and corporate 
money’s flow into politics.”). 
20 See infra Section III.B. 
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part II analyzes the origins of counterspeech 
and its relationship to the marketplace of ideas from political philosophy to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s adoption of counterspeech throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. It describes how counterspeech was initially formulated by John Milton and 
tracks its evolution through the last century of American jurisprudence, beginning 
with the Supreme Court’s revitalization of the First Amendment in the early twentieth 
century. 
Part III examines more deeply how the justifications for counterspeech have 
changed in American law. This evolution highlights some of the challenges with how 
counterspeech is received at the current moment, as the courts have not explicitly 
acknowledged how and why counterspeech’s rationale has evolved. This lack of 
clarity contributes to some of the misunderstandings and criticisms of counterspeech 
today, which this Part also explores. 
Part IV describes how, even if courts decline to re-evaluate or modify 
counterspeech, the increasing use of counterspeech in non-First Amendment contexts 
— most notably, social media platforms — requires engagement with criticisms of the 
doctrine. It argues that if courts and private entities that employ counterspeech 
doctrine as a justification for minimal regulation of speech fail to proactively articulate 
why counterspeech matters, popular support for counterspeech as the preferred 
remedy for disfavored speech may continue to erode — particularly in venues that are 
not required to rely upon judicial interpretations.  
The Supreme Court’s recent free speech jurisprudence demonstrates that 
counterspeech remains a cornerstone of First Amendment jurisprudence. While 
counterspeech itself might not be in danger, the growing public confusion and 
disapproval for counterspeech does not bode well for popular support for the doctrine. 
Amidst claims of “First Amendment Lochnerism” from a variety of fronts,21 
counterspeech needs to respond to its critics, even if it does not change in its contours. 
Whether counterspeech ever functioned effectively to achieve the goals set out by 
philosophers or judges, it cannot bear the weight that judges and private entities have 
placed upon it. Counterspeech is not a silver bullet that always justifies overturning 
government regulation. It cannot successfully rebut every instance of offensive, 
incendiary, or threatening speech in the public square or in spaces governed by private 
actors. While it will always be a valuable element of public debate and in the 
marketplace of ideas, counterspeech cannot sustain all the legal, social, and rhetorical 
burdens that we currently freight it with.  
A laissez faire approach to speech regulation that relies upon counterspeech to cure 
all ills neglects the shortcomings of the marketplace of ideas, as well as the ways in 
which counterspeech has mutated over time in American law. As a proponent of 
counterspeech, I argue that we must change our perception of its importance. Working 
in concert with other tools — including government regulation — rather than to the 




21 See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First 
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1959–60 (2018); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 
2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 135–38 (2016). 
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II. ORIGINS OF THE COUNTERSPEECH DOCTRINE 
As discussed supra, counterspeech is a commonly invoked, slippery term. For 
purposes of this Article, I define counterspeech as “speech that responds to other 
speech, particularly unpopular, disfavored, offensive, or discriminatory speech.” 
Individual speakers and entities — not the government — engage in counterspeech. 
For its proponents, counterspeech promotes public debate and discourse from the 
ground up, from speakers. This model is treated as de facto preferable to a model in 
which the state intervenes in public discourse, picking winners and losers amongst 
ideas. One obvious fear of a state-controlled system — in which the state chooses what 
messages to promote or suppress — is that the state will instinctually muzzle speech 
critical of the state and will amplify speech that supports it. Thus, counterspeech, 
expressed by individual citizens, better promotes democratic values through debate in 
a public square than a statist model where the government holds all the cards. 
Allowing speech to be answered by counterspeech rather than the state also has 
appeal for those skeptical of the government’s ability to effectively regulate traditional 
markets. Not for nothing does counterspeech operate within the “marketplace of 
ideas” framework. Under this model, the marketplace of ideas functions as a venue for 
public debate in which counterspeech operates to promote public discourse. The 
marketplace of ideas, like other markets under a late capitalistic economic system, 
should have minimal government regulation in order to allow the best ideas to win 
out. This is analogizable to the goal from some quarters of reducing government 
regulation in order to foster competition and lower consumer prices — 
effectively letting the market decide how the market functions. As discussed infra, 
there are many obvious critiques of both the “counterspeech” and “marketplace of 
ideas” concepts. Articulating both concepts as a preliminary matter is necessary, in 
order to both understand what the concepts actually encompass and to avoid the 
ambiguity that tends to accrue in debates regarding their conceptual efficacy.  
Within American jurisprudence, counterspeech has its origins in the early 
twentieth century Supreme Court cases that created our modern conception of the First 
Amendment — namely Schenck v. United States,22 Abrams v. United States,23 and 
Whitney v. California.24 Theoretically, counterspeech has earlier philosophical 
antecedents as a concept related to (but distinct from) the marketplace of ideas. The 
writings of John Milton, John Stuart Mill, and other theorists formed the intellectual 
basis for the theory of “the marketplace of ideas,” which relies upon counterspeech as 
a necessary element in order to function. In the marketplace of ideas, viewpoints and 
perspectives face off, with some responding to or rebutting others in order to “win 
out.” Counterspeech is a necessary part of this process.   
This Part explores the theoretical origins of counterspeech and its incorporation 
into modern First Amendment doctrine. It then proceeds to discuss how counterspeech 




22 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
23 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
24 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
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A. Marketplace Theory 
Democratic political systems arguably require freedom of speech in order to 
effectively function.25 Freedom of speech allows for social debate of ideas, issues, and 
public figures without the fear of governmental reprisal or censorship targeted against 
unpopular or fringe opinions. Within the Anglo-American tradition, John Milton’s 
Areopagitica contains an early articulation of why governmental censorship of speech 
conflicts with the quest for truth in the public sphere: 
[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so 
Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to 
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth 
put to the worse, in a free and open encounter?26 
Milton here describes concepts that echo in the marketplace of ideas metaphor 
(“the field” where Truth’s strength should not be doubted) and counterspeech as a 
remedy for disfavored ideas (Truth grappling with Falsehood, and indisputably 
winning). The direct confrontation of Truth and Falsehood — with an uncontested 
victor — prefigures both the contemporary conception of counterspeech as a Hegelian 
struggle and the shortcomings of that conception. Whether speech actually functions 
in this way in the public sphere is not at all self-evident. The relationship between 
what we would now call the marketplace of ideas and counterspeech is also not clear 
— the most obvious reading would be that counterspeech takes place within the setting 
of the marketplace, as a distinct dynamic. In other words, the marketplace of ideas 
provides the venue for counterspeech to play out.  
Areopagitica was not written primarily to advocate against government 
intervention in the public sphere. Milton wrote his pamphlet in order to protest against 
the Licensing Order of 1643, which would have required authors to have a license 
from the government before publishing their works.27 Milton’s argument, therefore, 
should be primarily understood as a critique not of government regulation but rather 
of mandatory licensing and pre-publication review — what we would now consider 
prior restraint.28 
Broad mandatory licensing regimes can be characterized as part of speech 
regulation. However, because they effectively require preclearance for a wide range 
of speech, they are more pernicious and thus more akin to prior restraints. The 
Licensing Order would not have limited Milton’s speech on specific topics, but rather 
the distribution of all material before it could be disseminated to the public at large. 
Thus, it is more akin to a prior restraint than more traditional speech regulations. 
 
25 See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 7 (2004). 
26 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 58 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1918) (1644). 
27 See Vincent Blasi, Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment (Yale L. Sch. 
Occasional Papers, Paper No. 6, 1995), 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=ylsop_papers 
[https://perma.cc/2HSK-43MG]. 
28 See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558–60 (1976) (“[P]rior restraints on 
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First 
Amendment rights.”). 
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This distinction has relevance in American law given how severely prior restraints 
are disfavored as compared to other types of speech regulation. Prior restraints are 
almost always invalidated, given their breadth and lack of tailoring.29 By contrast, 
regulations that limit speech may have a better chance of viability, depending on a 
number of variables including the nature, structure, and purpose of the regulation; the 
type of speech regulated; the penalties (whether civil or criminal); and the methods by 
which the state seeks to enforce the regulation on a practical basis. Put another way, 
speech regulation as a category is less odious than the subcategory of prior restraint, 
which the Licensing Order more clearly resembled.  
Thus, Milton’s framing of the appeal of counterspeech must necessarily be seen as 
a contrast to the broad nature of the Licensing Order (and by nature, prior restraints), 
rather than the entire category of speech regulation itself. It is not by any means certain 
that Milton was objecting to all types of speech regulation and promoting 
counterspeech as the only solution. One can plausibly read Areopagitica as a critique 
of the more limited category of what we would now refer to as prior restraint.  
John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty also provides a philosophical justification for 
minimal governmental intervention into speech, focusing on the difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of consistently and accurately silencing disfavored or inaccurate speech: 
First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for aught we 
can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility. 
Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and very 
commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the general or prevailing 
opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the 
collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance 
of being supplied. Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but 
the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and 
earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be held in the 
manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its rational 
grounds.30 
Mill conceives of opinions that are more complex than merely “true” or “false.” 
Rather, opinions can fall along a spectrum of accuracy, and rarely are the last word on 
a topic. In public discourse, opinions should “collide” to help discern the actual truth 
on a topic. Without such contestation, truth will be less likely to be publicly agreed 
upon. In a Hegelian sense, truth is strengthened and perhaps even discovered only 
through its conflicts with falsity and with counterspeech.31 
Again, while this may resemble the style of an in-person intellectual debate, it does 
not necessarily reflect how speech occurs in the public sphere in our contemporary 
moment. The dynamic described also does not conceive of a marketplace (or any other 
venue) as the location for the discussion or contestation of the “incorrect” opinion. 
 
29 See, e.g., id. at 568 (“[T]his prohibition regarding ‘implicative’ information is too vague and 
too broad to survive the scrutiny we have given to restraints on First Amendment rights.”). 
30 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 115–16 (Pelican Books 1974) (1859). 
31 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY 321–22 (Garden City Publ’g Co., new rev. ed. 
1933) (1926). 
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Mill’s analysis of how ideas interact in public discourse has more nuance than 
Milton’s, though both conceive of a final articulation of “truth” as a desirable, 
achievable goal. Mill’s concerns about government regulation of speech have as much 
to do with administrability as with the utility of such regulation. American courts have 
taken up several of these objections and concerns as the foundation for why, under the 
modern understanding of the First Amendment, counterspeech and a laissez faire 
regulatory approach to unpopular speech remain preferable to government regulation. 
American courts and scholars generally refer to the marketplace concept as the 
metaphorical space in civil society in which ideas are espoused, debated, and refined. 
Speech and counterspeech tangle within the marketplace, which, like the economic 
model, theoretically allows for all to participate. In so doing, the public can determine 
what is best, true, or accepted in social discourse.  
B. Initial Articulations of Counterspeech in American Jurisprudence 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court transformed its 
conception of the First Amendment in cases like Schenck v. United States32 and 
Abrams v. United States.33 Those cases revived the First Amendment from its earlier 
existence as a “dead letter” in American law.  
Schenck, decided in 1919, began the Court’s modern consideration of the 
protections granted by the First Amendment and how those protections interact with 
federal law — specifically, recently enacted laws that limited the publication of 
information, such as the Espionage Act34 and the Sedition Act.35 Schenck concerned 
two defendants, Elizabeth Baer and Charles Schenck, who were active in the American 
Socialist Party and had been convicted for distributing material criticizing the U.S. 
military’s efforts in World War I, including the draft.36 In a unanimous opinion, Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. argued that the First Amendment did not bar conviction 
as the speech at issue constituted a “clear and present danger” that Congress had the 
right to prevent by enacting laws like the Espionage Act.37 
Later in 1919, Abrams continued the Court’s examination of the contours of the 
protections granted by the First Amendment. Abrams featured facts similar to Schenck 
— both cases addressed speech recently criminalized by Congress. In Abrams, the 
Court addressed the convictions of Jacob Abrams and other activists who had printed 
pamphlets critiquing the American government’s involvement in the World War I. 
The Court applied the clear and present danger test from Schenck and upheld the 
convictions.38  
 
32 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
33 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
34 Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–99).  
35 Sedition Act, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
36 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49–50. 
37 Id. at 52. 
38 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619, 623–24. 
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In a sharp move away from his unanimous majority opinion in Schenck, Justice 
Holmes penned a dissenting opinion in Abrams, which Justice Louis Brandeis joined. 
Justice Holmes argued in his dissent that, though he still endorsed the clear and present 
danger test he had articulated in Schenck, the conduct in Abrams did not meet that 
test.39 The distinctions Justice Holmes draws between his majority opinion in Schenck 
and the dissent in Abrams do not seem as clear as he argues, but his concluding 
arguments in favor of the discussion of ideas rather than government censorship 
continue to resound in First Amendment jurisprudence: 
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of 
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get 
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is 
the theory of our Constitution.40 
Here, Justice Holmes emphasizes marketplace theory in ways similar to Milton 
and Mill — as the preferable venue for testing ideas for truth and validity — and also 
emphasizes its connection to constitutional principles set forth in the First 
Amendment. Though Justice Holmes is writing in dissent, his invocation of the 
marketplace of ideas as necessary to validate constitutional rights has become one of 
the most famous in defining the philosophical justifications for the modern First 
Amendment. 
Because the theory defining the marketplace of ideas requires counterspeech in 
order to function, it is not surprising that the concept of counterspeech would also soon 
enter into the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence. Eight years after Abrams, 
counterspeech was explicitly articulated in Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion in 
Whitney v. California.41 Whitney concerned the conviction of a California woman, 
Charlotte Anita Whitney, for violating California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act, which 
prohibited the promotion of certain social movements.42 Whitney had worked to 
establish a branch of the Communist Labor Party in Oakland, which California 
claimed advocated for violent overthrow of the government.43 Under the Court’s 
“clear and present danger” test, articulated in Schenck, Whitney’s conviction was 
upheld.44  
Justice Brandeis, who agreed with the ruling, wrote separately to describe his 
views on laws prohibiting speech and the goals of the Constitution’s drafters: 
 
39 Id. at 627–28. 
40 Id. at 630. 
41 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927). 
42 Id. at 372–73. 
43 Id. at 363–64. 
44 Id. at 371. 
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Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did 
not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To 
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and 
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no 
danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the 
incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through 
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of 
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. 
Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority 
is to be reconciled with freedom.45  
This passage, through its stirring description of the value of “more speech” as the 
preferred remedy for disfavored, false, and dangerous speech, serves as the 
cornerstone of counterspeech doctrine in American law. In order to avoid implicating 
Schenck’s clear and present danger test, Justice Brandeis exempts situations in which 
there may be an imminent threat of physical harm or violence resulting from the 
original speech, as there supposedly was in Schenck. In all other situations involving 
“evil” words, Justice Brandeis chooses to elevate counterspeech as the preferred path 
forward, rather than governmental repression that conflicts with the liberty interests, 
in his view, that the founders were working to protect.46 
Justice Brandeis’s framing of counterspeech has been adopted as the clarion call 
for civil libertarians and First Amendment proponents for decades.47 By emphasizing 
the need for more speech in order to combat disfavored speech, Brandeis emphasizes 
the desirability of the exchange of ideas as opposed to alternate solutions, most 
obviously government regulation or censorship. There are multiple unacknowledged 
assumptions underneath Brandeis’s framing that many scholars have identified.48 
These criticisms have not prevented counterspeech from becoming a cornerstone of 
First Amendment doctrine.  
C. Counterspeech Since Whitney 
In the decades since Whitney, courts have validated the views espoused by Justice 
Brandeis regarding counterspeech. Schenck’s clear and present danger test (which was 
applied in Abrams and Whitney) was supplanted (and arguably overruled) in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio,49 which articulated an “imminent lawless action” standard 
prohibiting the punishment of inflammatory speech unless that speech is “directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
 
45 Id. at 377. 
46 Justice Brandeis concurred in the judgment of the majority, rather than dissenting, due to his 
perception that Whitney and other organizers may have been planning a conspiracy. Id. at 379 
(Brandeis, J., concurring). 
47 See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 7, at 7. 
48 See infra Part III. 
49 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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action.”50 Brandenburg involved a leader in the Ku Klux Klan who delivered speeches 
calling for racial violence against African Americans, Jews, and those who supported 
those groups; he was subsequently charged with advocating violence and violating 
Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism statute (which was somewhat analogous to the statute in 
Whitney).51 The Brandenburg Court overruled Whitney and articulated the new 
“imminent lawless action” test.52 Now, Whitney is most often cited not for the 
majority but for Justice Brandeis’s concurrence, for its articulation of counterspeech 
as the preferred remedy for disfavored speech. 
The Supreme Court has used Justice Brandeis’s formulation in cases involving 
such varied free speech issues as ordinances governing “For Sale” and “Sold” signs,53 
the constitutionality of flag burning,54 and the criminalization of “false speech.”55 In 
each of these cases, the Court uses counterspeech as the foil for overbroad, 
unnecessary, or excessive government actions that seek to limit speech.56 
Counterspeech thus functions not merely as a goal but also as a powerful de-regulatory 
tool. Rather than permit government actors to put their thumb on the scale to achieve 
certain economic, social, or regulatory goals by directly limiting speech, courts are 
inclined to prefer non-governmental speech as the method of achieving those goals in 
a majority of circumstances. 
The Court’s recent articulation of counterspeech as the preferred solution to 
disfavored speech in United States v. Alvarez provides a potent example of this 
phenomenon. Alvarez concerned the Stolen Valor Act,57 which created a federal 
criminal law prohibiting individuals from falsely claiming that they had received the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.58 At issue in Alvarez was the ability of the government 
to criminalize false speech. Alvarez lacked a clear majority, but six Justices agreed 
that the Stolen Valor Act was not drafted with sufficient narrowness or specificity, and 
it levied too severe a penalty to stay within the bounds of the First Amendment.59  
 
50 Id. at 447. 
51 Id. at 444–45, 447. 
52 The “imminent lawless action” test effectively allows much more speech to proliferate than 
under prior cases. Id. at 447–48. 
53 Linmark Assocs. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977). 
54 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989).  
55 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012). 
56 Lower courts also rely upon Whitney in their analyses of free speech issues. See, e.g., Lind v. 
Grimmer, 30 F.3d 1115, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 1994) (concerning disclosure of information of 
campaign spending investigations); List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 773 
(S.D. Ohio 2014) (concerning statutes criminalizing false statements made regarding candidates 
during political campaigns). 
57 18 U.S.C. § 704, recognized as unconstitutional by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Kelly, 434 F. 
Supp. 3d 974 (D. Kan. 2020). 
58 See 18 U.S.C. § 704(c). 
59 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 729. 
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Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, observed that counterspeech would serve 
as the preferred remedy for false speech: “The remedy for speech that is false is speech 
that is true. This is the ordinary course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned 
is the rational; to the uninformed, the enlightened; to the straightout lie, the simple 
truth.”60 While there is something appealingly elegant about the simplicity of Justice 
Kennedy’s framing — similar to that of Justice Brandeis’s — it elides many of the 
complexities of speech in a modern marketplace of thought. 
One can read the lies at issue in Alvarez in multiple ways. Lying by claiming that 
one has received the Congressional Medal of Honor is perhaps the easiest type of 
disfavored speech to invalidate, given that factually correct and independently 
verifiable information can easily be brought to bear in response to a lie. On the other 
hand, such a lie is particularly pernicious and difficult to correct, given that it requires 
suspicion directed at the speaker, investigation to discern the truth, and a venue to 
publicize the accurate findings. One’s views on the efficacy and ease of exposing such 
obvious lies — to say nothing of more insidious, less contestable ones — in the 
marketplace of ideas may be correlated to one’s belief that the marketplace privileges 
truth, volume, or persuasiveness. 
As a result of Alvarez, false speech retains constitutional protections (although 
likely less than “core speech”), reducing the categories of speech that fail to receive 
protection to a mere handful. Whether counterspeech can function in its Brandeisian 
ideal in a marketplace that allows nearly everything to be expressed, with few 
governmental restrictions, remains at the very least debatable. 
D. The “Is Counterspeech Effective?” Debate 
If the courts have endorsed counterspeech as the best remedy for speech that we 
dislike, a number of First Amendment advocates — both in academic and popular 
writing — have embraced it as the slogan that justifies an expansive view of free 
speech protection. Governmental proposals, laws, regulations, or actions that limit 
disfavored speech are often criticized by civil libertarians for using the heavy hand of 
the state to suppress speech or manipulate the marketplace. Instead, they argue, the 
government and society at large should allow counterspeech to do its job and let the 
unpopular speech be pushed down by counterspeech.61 
For civil libertarians, the government is ill-suited for a number of reasons to 
manage speech.62 Because democratic institutions function through the consent of the 
governed, the government has an interest in minimizing or eliminating opinions that 
criticize it in order to perpetuate its legitimacy. It may also choose to sanction or 
prohibit undesirable speech in order to promote stability and conformity. The 
government may also not be institutionally well situated to adjudicate whether speech 
 
60 Id.  
61 See, e.g., STROSSEN, supra note 7, at 157–82 (arguing that counterspeech is a more effective 
rebuttal to hate speech than governmental regulation). For a discussion of how speech can be 
managed or mismanaged, see Jeremy Waldron, A Raucous First Amendment, KNIGHT FIRST 
AMEND. INST. AT COLUM. UNIV. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/a-raucous-
first-amendment-1 [https://perma.cc/L6WE-6ZXP]. 
62 Individual civil libertarians, of course, may agree with only some of these criticisms of 
government regulation of speech, depending on their perspective. 
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is accurate, valuable, or correct, as those determinations are arguably best left to 
individuals rather than the state. 
Civil libertarians therefore frequently point to employing counterspeech in the 
marketplace of ideas as the preferred solution to speech that is disfavored.63 There are 
many debates in which this argument is deployed in order to argue against regulation 
of speech targeting racial minorities, women, and other groups. One of the 
foundational intellectual debates concerning the relative efficacy of counterspeech 
versus hate speech regulation involved former ACLU president and New York Law 
School Professor Nadine Strossen and Professor Charles Lawrence III, then of 
Stanford Law School, in 1989 and 1990.64  
The debate principally concerned the then-recent trend of colleges and universities 
enacting “hate speech codes” prohibiting speech that discriminated against racial 
minorities. Professors Strossen and Lawrence debated the efficacy and 
constitutionality of this trend first at the Biennial Conference of the ACLU, and later 
in the Duke Law Journal.65 Professor Lawrence argued that carefully crafted rules 
regarding speech on campus would not violate the First Amendment, asserting that the 
civil libertarian devotion to counterspeech is “an empty ideal” that ignores real life 
experiences of marginalized communities.66 The current interpretation of the First 
Amendment, in his view, allows hate speech to proliferate;67 those who endorse it, he 
argues, turn a blind eye to racist rhetoric.68 
Professor Strossen’s response, on the other hand, serves as a classic example of 
the civil libertarian response to these criticisms — that the principle of counterspeech 
is “time-honored,” that it is consistent with First Amendment principles, and that it 
actually is more effective than censorship would be.69 In responding to Professor 
Lawrence’s criticisms, Professor Strossen argues that strong free speech protections 
actually benefit, rather than hinder, racial justice. Counterspeech and the marketplace 
of ideas, in her view, are how racial progress actually happens — without it, 
advancements like those in the 1960s would have been unlikely, if not impossible.70  
The debate between Professors Lawrence and Strossen reflects how adherence to 
counterspeech can seem, to some, as negating the ability to restrict almost any kind of 
speech that disfavors or discriminates, and as raising the First Amendment’s 
protections to a level that potentially ignores the protections given by other 
 
63 See, e.g., Danny O’Brien & Dia Kayyali, Facing the Challenge of Online Harassment, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/01/facing-challenge-
online-harassment [https://perma.cc/ZLS6-X8ZY]. 
64 See Lawrence, supra note 11, at 432; Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: 
A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (1990).  
65 See Strossen, supra note 64, at 484 n.†. 
66 Lawrence, supra note 11, at 438, 476–81. 
67 Id. at 436. 
68 Id. at 477. 
69 Strossen, supra note 64, at 562.  
70 Id. at 567–69. 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/5
2021] CHANGING COUNTERSPEECH 765 
constitutional doctrines like due process or equal protection. While the campus speech 
codes that Professors Lawrence and Strossen debate were invalidated or limited by 
judicial decisions,71 similar debates involving different categories of troubling speech 
have proliferated in the subsequent decades. Speech that is anti-Semitic, 
Islamophobic, racist, sexist, misogynistic, transphobic, anti-LGBT, and ableist all can 
face calls for banning, censorship, or removal, even as civil libertarians respond by 
arguing for counterspeech, technical solutions, and strong protections for most speech 
— even speech that many, if not most Americans would find to be hurtful, 
discriminatory, or valueless. 
Critiques of counterspeech are not new, but they are increasing both in volume and 
in sophistication.72 Analyzing exactly how counterspeech and the marketplace of ideas 
concepts have been critiqued over time in American legal scholarship helps to 
understand both the current dynamics and how, theoretically, counterspeech and the 
marketplace of ideas have remained such vexing concepts. 
III. COUNTERSPEECH AND CHANGE 
As discussed in Part II, supra, counterspeech remains a cornerstone of free speech 
doctrine even as its critics have observed deficiencies in how counterspeech and the 
marketplace of ideas operates in practice, as well as shortcomings in its theoretical 
underpinnings. This Part discusses these critiques in greater context in order to 
illuminate the widening gap between judicial invocation of counterspeech and the 
larger social and political discourse regarding whether counterspeech can ever 
function as effectively as judges suggest. This gap may explain why counterspeech is 
the subject of broader social critique, beyond the realm of theorists and academics.  
A. Changes in Judicial Conceptions of Counterspeech 
Early philosophical conceptions of counterspeech by Milton and Mill, amongst 
others, describe the process of counterspeech as a search for truth in the larger 
marketplace of ideas.73 In this framing, “the truth” is thus something discoverable (as 
opposed to a contested or ineffable concept). Indeed, the marketplace of ideas allows 
for the collision of ideas in order to produce something ever closer to the truth. 
Eventually, as this process repeats, the best, strongest ideas will prevail in this 
tournament of debate. 
The early American judicial decisions advocating for counterspeech as the 
preferred method for regulating speech reinforce this perspective from political 
philosophy. In Abrams, Justice Holmes argues that “free trade in ideas” leads to the 
ultimate good;74 in Whitney, Justice Brandeis argues that more speech is the method 
for combating bad ideas through deliberation and education.75 These decisions 
describe a venue for social discussion, deliberation, and argument. Implicitly, the 
 
71 See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
72 See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Fearless Speech, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 294, 309–11 (2019). 
73 See supra Section II.A. 
74 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
75 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).  
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Justices endorse the concept of the marketplace of ideas as a public sphere where 
anyone can participate, and, through the diversity of perspectives and debates, the truth 
will prevail. 
There are several obvious criticisms of this formulation, but what is notable to a 
contemporary reader is how different these justifications are as compared to current 
judicial descriptions of why counterspeech is preferable to government regulation. 
When judges argue for counterspeech in recent decisions, they do not merely describe 
social debate as a search for truth. Instead, counterspeech is also posited as the best 
option as compared to government regulation of speech. Put another way, judges do 
not merely assert that counterspeech is effective or that truth is discoverable — rather, 
that it is preferable to any alternatives. 
Consider Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in United States v. Alvarez, the case 
concerning whether the government could impose criminal liability upon a speaker 
who falsely claimed to have received the Congressional Medal of Honor. Justice 
Kennedy noted:  
The lack of a causal link between the Government’s stated interest and the 
Act is not the only way in which the Act is not actually necessary to achieve 
the Government’s stated interest. The Government has not shown, and cannot 
show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest. The facts 
of this case indicate that the dynamics of free speech, of counterspeech, of 
refutation, can overcome the lie.76 
Here, Justice Kennedy contrasts the effectiveness of counterspeech against the 
language of the Stolen Valor Act. Rather than regulate (or criminalize, in this instance) 
a certain type of speech, Justice Kennedy argues here that counterspeech would reach 
the same ends. Speech is preferred over action (criminalization or other state action, 
or more drastically violence). It is not that counterspeech is being employed in a 
process to “discover” the truth, but rather that it is more effective and preferable to 
any kind of government action.77 If counterspeech is ever a viable option, it seems to 
automatically win out over government regulation or sanction. Speech will always 
trump the state. 
Appellate courts have similarly employed counterspeech as a preferred alternative 
to government regulation. In 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, the Eighth Circuit 
evaluated a First Amendment challenge to a Minnesota state law that criminalized 
speech that knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth made a false statement 
pertaining to a proposed ballot initiative.78 In determining that the Minnesota law 
 
76 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 726 (2012). 
77 The “lie” mentioned here is the false statement that Alvarez made. See id. at 713, 727. The 
truth is not “unknown” in this instance, unlike in the classic conception of counterspeech. Justice 
Kennedy’s reference to the lie is not made in the context of counterspeech as a search for an 
unknown truth through the competition of ideas, but rather to counterspeech minimizing the risk 
of a false statement proliferating as contrasted against the Stolen Valor Act’s criminalization of 
the false statement itself.  
78 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 777–78 (8th Cir. 2014). 
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violated the First Amendment, the court noted that counterspeech remained a potential 
tool to meet the state’s stated goals in criminalizing this type of speech.79  
This is a somewhat surprising move. Why did the court decide that the potential 
for counterspeech meant that the Minnesota law could not withstand First Amendment 
scrutiny? Counterspeech is not an element of the test that the court used to evaluate 
whether the statute was narrowly tailored.80 Rather, the court used this articulation:  
A narrowly tailored regulation is one that actually advances the state's interest 
(is necessary), does not sweep too broadly (is not overinclusive), does not 
leave significant influences bearing on the interest unregulated (is not 
underinclusive), and could be replaced by no other regulation that could 
advance the interest as well with less infringement of speech (is the least-
restrictive alternative).81 
Counterspeech does not appear at all in this formulation, yet the court referred to 
it in its analysis.82 Specifically, the court decided that counterspeech was the least-
restrictive alternative to the statute, and that it was difficult to imagine an alternative 
statute that would be permissible and meet the government’s interest.83  
But counterspeech is not a governmental program, statute, or regulation. Its 
existence as an alternate method to a challenged statute does not necessarily mean that 
that the statute is not the least restrictive means. Counterspeech is not a governmental 
regulation, and it theoretically always exists.84 Moreover, the state does not have the 
 
79 Id. at 793. The court’s counterspeech analysis accompanied its narrow tailoring analysis: 
Notwithstanding its overbreadth, the lack of a causal link between the 
advanced interests and [the statute] is not the only way in which [the 
statute] is not actually necessary to achieve the stated interests. A second 
consideration in our analysis as to whether [the statute] is narrowly tailored 
to achieve Minnesota’s asserted compelling interest in preserving fair and 
honest elections and preventing a fraud on the electorate, is that the county 
attorneys have not offered persuasive evidence to dispel the generally 
accepted proposition that counterspeech may be a logical solution to the 
interest advanced in this case. 
Id. 
80 Counterspeech conceivably could be folded into the first prong of the test. The state’s 
regulation of speech might be deemed unnecessary if counterspeech exists as a viable 
alternative. But if one interprets counterspeech thusly, almost any governmental action could 
be invalidated given the abstract possibility of counterspeech. Moreover, because courts invoke 
counterspeech as a concept, rather than as a factual element in a specific case, it could become 
far too easy or automatic to call upon the abstract power of counterspeech as a death knell for 
many governmental actions. 
81 Id. at 787 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 751 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
82 Id. at 787–88. 
83 Id. at 793–94. 
84 One could imagine very few contexts in which counterspeech was not an option. “Fighting 
words” might be the rare situation in which there may not be time to allow counterspeech to push 
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ability to precisely promote or facilitate counterspeech beyond very generalized ways, 
and usually not on specific issues (like false speech in political campaigns). The state’s 
use of counterspeech will almost be a blunt instrument, given that it will generally act 
ex ante through official channels. “State counterspeech” at best seems propagandistic, 
and at worst oxymoronical, as the state’s engagement in the marketplace of ideas as 
“speaker” would be difficult to disentangle from its role as regulator. 
Yet the Eighth Circuit in Arneson observed that “counterspeech confronts these 
asserted compelling interests and is a less restrictive means of countering the concern 
leads us again to deduce that the interests are less compelling than touted and the 
statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal.”85 This suggests that 
counterspeech, if viable, de facto obviates the state’s ability to regulate speech that 
raises content discrimination issues.86  
Other federal appellate decisions make similar claims. For example, in North 
Carolina Right to Life v. Leake, a case involving North Carolina’s campaign finance 
law, the Fourth Circuit argued that independent expenditure committees did not need 
to be regulated: “The appropriate legislative response to potentially effective speech 
from organizations like the Farmers for Fairness [an example of such a committee] is 
not to silence them through regulation, but rather to appeal to the electorate with 
effective counter-speech.”87 
The argument here seems to be that rather than enacting a state law, state 
legislatures could push back through counterspeech. Like the Arneson court, the 
Fourth Circuit here seems to assert that if counterspeech exists as a viable alternative, 
it should be employed. But the court elided the distinction between the North Carolina 
legislature and individual state legislators in discussing the possibility of effective 
counterspeech. While individual legislators could certainly use counterspeech, it is 
more difficult to imagine how the legislature as a whole could do so, other than by 
enacting a statute. 
Courts have not completely abandoned the idea that counterspeech helps American 
society discover the truth.88 Such references, though, are less common than those 
which refer to counterspeech as better than the alternative government regulation.89 
When judges wax rhapsodic on why the First Amendment validates counterspeech, 
 
back against the unwanted speech at issue. Beyond that type of exigent situation, almost any 
context allows for counterspeech to take hold. As such, the reasoning here implies that any type 
of government regulation targeting certain types of speech would violate the First Amendment. 
85 Arneson, 766 F.3d at 793. 
86 N.C. Right to Life, Inc., v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 305 (4th Cir. 2008).  
87 Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)). 
88 See, e.g., Hustler Mag. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False statements of fact are 
particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace 
of ideas . . . .”). 
89 See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Couns., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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they raise concerns about the dangers of government regulation and liability more 
often than describing a quest for truth.90 
What might be the reasons that judges consider counterspeech, when feasible, as 
per se preferable to government regulation? What seems to be underlying the appeal 
of counterspeech is not the idea that it helps us find the truth, but rather that it provides 
an alternative to government regulation. Even if that alternative is speculative or 
illusory, courts seem eager to point to counterspeech as a better method of combating 
speech than regulation.  
Because courts do not explicitly indicate that they are invoking counterspeech in a 
new way — not as a truth-seeking force, but rather as a viable alternative to regulation 
— it is not obvious why they are doing so. It is possible that the preference for 
counterspeech stems from skittishness regarding government regulations that 
implicate speech rights. If the First Amendment is intended to protect against 
government intrusion into speech, any possible alternative might be preferred, even if 
it is merely suppositional. For those who hold as a default position philosophical 
opposition to government regulation of speech — or for those who are concerned 
about the government’s ability to effectively, thoughtfully, or carefully regulate 
speech — counterspeech is certainly appealing. But this use of counterspeech is quite 
different than the truth-seeking function described in Whitney and earlier 
philosophical formulations. 
This shift matters for two reasons. First, it moves counterspeech from a vital 
component of the public marketplace of ideas, where ideas are debated and truth 
necessarily wins out, to a hypothetical, perpetually superior alternative to government 
regulation. Counterspeech is no longer an element of what the public debates and 
decides. Now, it serves as a contrast for courts skeptical of government intervention 
into any area that might be considered speech. Yet, judges still describe counterspeech 
in the same way, often citing to Whitney, without noting that they use the concept in 
ways distinct from Justice Brandeis. If courts have moved away from the truth-seeking 
function of counterspeech to more instrumentalist concerns about the efficacy of 
government regulation of speech, it is important to note that for clarity and 
consistency.91 
Second, as discussed in Section IV.B, infra, there are multiple critiques of the 
counterspeech doctrine and its efficacy in actually achieving a truth — most 
obviously, as to whether this is even a feasible exercise or if truth exists, and whether 
there actually is equal access to the marketplace of ideas in order to employ 
counterspeech. These critiques are generally responding to the classical conception of 
counterspeech and the mantra often deployed that “the only cure for bad speech is 
more speech.”  
 
90 For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, which extended First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech, the majority opinion described Virginia’s regulations of 
pharmacists as “highly paternalistic.” Id. at 770. 
91 The reasons for this shift are non-obvious, in part because the shift itself has gone 
unacknowledged. It is possible that the balkanization of public discourse — a move away from 
a unified, largely homogenous media landscape to one that does not inherently seek communal 
truth-seeking as a goal — meant that courts needed to adjust how they conceived of 
counterspeech.  
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Yet, courts are more likely to describe counterspeech as an alternative to 
regulation, and critics are more likely to engage with the Brandeisian formulation. 
Non-judicial defenders of counterspeech sometimes do both. Thus, among those who 
choose to debate whether counterspeech is effective or preferable, it is not always clear 
whether the same conception is being discussed. Ironically, this may demonstrate the 
limits of counterspeech itself — if different parties can’t agree upon what a topic even 
is, how can the truth ever be discovered, or dangerous speech suppressed in the public 
square? 
B. Criticisms of Counterspeech over Time 
Critiques of counterspeech and its use in American law have proliferated as the 
doctrine has ascended post-Brandenburg. These critiques have focused on a variety of 
shortcomings in the assumptions underlying counterspeech and the marketplace of 
ideas, particularly with regard to the disconnect between how counterspeech and the 
marketplace of ideas are described theoretically, and how ideas are actually discussed 
in American society. Critiques touch upon the same issues described in Part II, supra, 
in the debates between Professors Lawrence and Strossen on the efficacy of hate 
speech regulation.  
This Section discusses critiques of both counterspeech and the marketplace of 
ideas, rather than just counterspeech, as counterspeech is rarely discussed in isolation. 
These related concepts, though distinct, are often discussed hand-in-hand by 
academics, judges, and the public. Some, though not all, criticisms of the marketplace 
of ideas pertain to counterspeech, and are discussed below. 
Stanley Ingber’s influential article of the effectiveness and assumptions of 
counterspeech and the marketplace of ideas highlights some common themes in 
subsequent critiques.92 Professor Ingber describes the following criticisms, which 
have continued to resound in scholarly and social debates: 
Scholarly critics of the marketplace model argue that the model 
itself suggests a vital need for government regulation of the market. The 
imagery of the marketplace of ideas is rooted in laissez-faire 
economics. Although laissez-faire economic theory asserts that desirable 
economic conditions are best promoted by a free market system, today’s 
economists widely admit that government regulation is needed to correct 
failures in the economic market caused by real world conditions. Similarly, 
real world conditions also interfere with the effective operation of the 
marketplace of ideas: sophisticated and expensive communication 
technology, monopoly control of the media, access limitations suffered by 
disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of behavior manipulation, 
irrational responses to propaganda, and the arguable nonexistence of 
objective truth, all conflict with marketplace ideals. Consequently, critics of 
the market model conclude, as have critics of laissez-faire economics, that 
state intervention is necessary to correct communicative market failures.93 
 
92 Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984).  
93 Id. at 5. 
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Professor Ingber wrote this passage over thirty-five years ago, yet many of the 
ongoing criticisms of marketplace theory and counterspeech are described herein 
— demonstrating that the debate has not progressed very much in recent decades. 
Common points of contention regarding the marketplace of ideas tend to arise as 
follows: 
 
• Unlike the traditional goods and services in a market which are bought and sold, 
speech in the marketplace of ideas is not actually traded and price signals do not 
exist, making it far from a traditional market.94 
• Even with a laissez-faire approach, American law enacts multiple regulations on 
the market; why shouldn’t the marketplace of ideas be similarly regulated?95 
• Technology exacerbates existing inequities in the marketplace and in society, 
preventing equal access of ideas.96 
• Speakers with less power or social influence will often have fewer or truly equal 
opportunities to participate in public discourse.97 
• Financial power or influence will distort the ability of individuals to equally 
access the marketplace of ideas.98 
• Individuals are not perfectly rational and thus may be swayed by untrue or 
misleading ideas, thus demonstrating the ineffectiveness of a purely truth-seeking 
marketplace.99  
 
94 See, e.g., Gregory Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the Marketplace of 
Ideas, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 1, 23 (2012) (describing the strengths and shortcomings 
of the marketplace of ideas metaphor as compared to traditional markets). 
95 See, e.g., Claudio Lombardi, The Illusion of a “Marketplace of Ideas” and the Right to Truth, 
3 AM. AFF. 1 (2019), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/the-illusion-of-a-marketplace-
of-ideas-and-the-right-to-truth/ [https://perma.cc/R4VD-KMLB] (arguing for some type of 
regulation for the marketplace of ideas). 
96 See, e.g., David Shih, Opinion, Hate Speech and the Misnomer of ‘The Marketplace of Ideas,’ 
NPR: CODE SW!TCH (May 3, 2017, 3:22 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/03/483264173/hate-speech-and-the-
misnomer-of-the-marketplace-of-ideas [https://perma.cc/U6XX-XKDP] (criticizing the 
marketplace of ideas metaphor and its tolerance for hate speech, particularly against racial 
minorities). 
97 See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, Imagining an Antisubordinating First Amendment, 118 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2117 (2018) (arguing for a First Amendment jurisprudence that promotes substantive 
rather than formal equality). 
98 See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986) 
(critiquing then-recent decisions for allowing an unbalanced, formalistic approach to the First 
Amendment to proliferate, invariably on the side of capital). 
99 See, e.g., Norbert Schwarz et al., Making the Truth Stick & the Myths Fade: Lessons from 
Cognitive Psychology, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 85, 86 (2016) (“The persistence of the necrotizing 
banana myth shows that correcting false beliefs is difficult and that correction attempts often fail 
because addressing misinformation actually gives it more airtime, increasing its familiarity and 
making it seem even more believable. For instance, one of the most frequently used correction 
strategies, the myth-versus-fact format, can backfire because of repetition of the myth, leaving 
people all the more convinced that their erroneous beliefs are correct. The simple repetition of a 
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• There is no evidence that counterspeech is actually effective in changing minds, 
discovering truth, or promoting democratic values.100 
 
While the goals of this Article are not to rehash these critiques, it is notable that 
despite the variety of criticisms of the marketplace of ideas and the efficacy of 
counterspeech, courts have not only generally declined to incorporate any of these 
criticisms, they also rarely acknowledge them. Instead, they generally resort to the 
Whitney formulation that the only cure for bad speech is more speech.101  
One prominent instance of a court acknowledging the shortfalls of counterspeech 
occurs in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, a Seventh Circuit case from 
1985.102 Hudnut concerned a First Amendment challenge to an anti-pornography 
ordinance enacted by Indianapolis. The ordinance had been drafted by two prominent 
feminist thinkers, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, in order to promote 
women’s equality.103 The ordinance prevented individuals from trafficking in 
pornography, coercing others from performing in pornographic works, or forcing 
pornography on others; if an individual was injured by someone who had seen or read 
pornography, they could file a lawsuit against the maker or seller.104  
Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, it would seem obvious that the 
Seventh Circuit would find such a statute unconstitutional, as it regulates speech 
protected by the First Amendment. At the time, though, the contours of protected 
speech were different, and the expansion of protected speech was arguably still in 
progress.105 The court, however, resorted to the classic concepts of the marketplace of 
ideas and the benefits of counterspeech in order to invalidate the ordinance.106  
 
falsehood, even by a questionable source, can lead people to actually believe the lie. The 
psychological research showing how people determine whether something is likely to be true has 
important implications for health communication strategies and can help point to more efficient 
approaches to disseminating well-established truths in general.”). 
100 See, e.g., Lynne Tirrell, Toxic Misogyny and the Limits of Counterspeech, 87 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2433, 2445–50 (2019) (describing how counterspeech operates and the limits of language 
in combating misogyny). 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 727–28 (2012) (“If there be time to expose 
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the 
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence . . . .” (quoting Whitney v. California, 
247 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
102 Am. Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). 
103 See Victoria Baranetsky, The Economic-Liberty Approach of the First Amendment: A Story 
of American Booksellers v. Hudnut, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., 169, 172–73. 
104 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325. 
105 Victoria Baranetsky argues that the Hudnut court extended the “marketplace of ideas” 
metaphor beyond its classic origins in political speech to expressive speech. Baranetsky, supra 
note 103, at 172, 179. Under this view, Hudnut was more innovative than it might seem, as it 
limited the categories of speech that the government could permissively regulate. 
106 Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325, 330–31, 333–34. 
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In the majority opinion, Judge Easterbrook notes some of the consequences of that 
approach — namely, that the goals of equality are subordinate to the goals of the First 
Amendment.107 At various points in the opinion, Judge Easterbrook observes that the 
marketplace of ideas and counterspeech have limitations that may impede their 
effectiveness, but argues that that system is preferable to the alternative of government 
as censor and thought police: 
Racial bigotry, anti-semitism, violence on television, reporters’ biases—
these and many more influence the culture and shape our socialization. None 
is directly answerable by more speech, unless that speech too finds its place 
in the popular culture. Yet all is protected as speech, however insidious. Any 
other answer leaves the government in control of all of the institutions of 
culture, the great censor and director of which thoughts are good for us. 
  . . . .  
At any time, some speech is ahead in the game; the more numerous speakers 
prevail. Supporters of minority candidates may be forever “excluded” from 
the political process because their candidates never win, because few people 
believe their positions. This does not mean that freedom of speech has 
failed.108 
This opinion is a rarity for its acknowledgement that counterspeech and the 
marketplace of ideas have the potential to perpetuate other forms of inequity and social 
ills. Yet, Judge Easterbrook characterizes any alternatives from the government as a 
form of thought policing, casting regulation as a de facto extreme overreach. The 
subtext of this view is that we all must live with even an ineffective marketplace of 
ideas and inequitable counterspeech opportunities, because any other scenario is so 
catastrophic for individuals that it cannot even be contemplated. The choice between 
government censorship and individual violence is so abhorrent that we, as a society, 
have apparently decided that we prefer the specter of the latter over the former.109 
Though the Hudnut opinion is rare for its acknowledgment that counterspeech and 
the marketplace of ideas have shortcomings, it echoes common judicial fears of 
dystopian speech regulation. Like many opinions, it also ignores critiques of the 
libertarian conception of the marketplace of ideas. As Victoria Baranetsky notes, the 
opinion acknowledges MacKinnon and Dworkin’s critiques but fails to substantively 
 
107 Id. at 325, 328. 
108 Id. at 330–31. 
109 This framing owes its justifications in a world in which the government’s ability to control 
media organizations (and thus much of the speech of individuals) was much higher than today. 
Arguably, the ability of the government to effectively censor is far lower today than it was in the 
past. Yet, the ability of the federal government to impede digital communication — a disturbing, 
though perhaps not far-fetched scenario — might mean that the dynamics haven’t shifted as much 
as one might like to believe. 
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engage their arguments.110 Instead, the opinion merely uses some of MacKinnon and 
Dworkin’s arguments to bolster its own view of the First Amendment.111 
There is no requirement that courts respond to popular critiques of counterspeech 
and the marketplace of ideas. Federal courts are not democratically elected 
institutions, for better or worse, and this purported insulation from politics arguably 
helps to protect individual rights of unpopular minority populations. Even if courts did 
more meaningfully engage with critiques, there is no evidence that this would change 
their approach. The canonization of counterspeech as the preferred method of 
managing unpopular speech and the veneration of the marketplace of ideas as an 
essential American value in constitutional law seems unshakeable.  
Yet counterspeech, at least, has changed. As discussed in Section III.A, supra, 
counterspeech has grown beyond its original formulation as a method to discover the 
truth in political discourse. It is now the preferred method of regulating speech — 
regardless of its effectiveness — because the only alternative is a surveillance state in 
which the government controls our thoughts. In essence, counterspeech is the new 
regulation, controlled by private parties, because the concept of public regulation of 
speech is too bitter a pill to swallow. 
These doctrines are not as cemented as we might think. They only appear so 
because courts don’t always acknowledge doctrinal shifts, such as the shift in why 
counterspeech is a superior alternative to government regulation. Therefore, at least 
theoretically, some aspects of the counterspeech doctrine and the conception of the 
marketplace of ideas can and should be revisited by judges when they use these 
doctrines in analyzing First Amendment claims. The following reforms are listed in 
order of likelihood of adoption, from most to least likely. 
First, courts should more explicitly acknowledge how counterspeech has shifted 
over time. The evolution from justifying counterspeech as a method of discovering 
truth to a superior alternative to government regulation is an important one, as it 
significantly shifts the judicial rationale for invalidating laws, ordinances, and 
regulations. Yet, it has not received significant attention or discussion from judges. 
This avoidance has led to an unfortunate ambiguity — when civil libertarians endorse 
counterspeech and critics argue for its narrowing or modification, they may not be 
discussing the same policies or theories. Without a common understanding on why the 
courts rely so heavily on counterspeech, these discussions may prove unfruitful. 
Second, courts should more directly engage with the extensive literature — both 
legal and non-legal — that critiques the assumptions underlying the marketplace of 
ideas and the efficacy of counterspeech. These concepts have long histories, but they 
are not infallible or irrebuttable. As the courts have consistently solidified the status 
of counterspeech, they have ignored the growing body of research that analyzes and 
challenges its efficacy. While courts need not necessarily engage with public disfavor 
or critique, the existing research could help refine or inform judicial evaluation of how 
and whether counterspeech can be an effective alternative to government regulation.  
At its core, counterspeech is a political theory, and its incorporation into free 
speech doctrine occurred prior to extensive empirical or qualitative engagement. 
When courts cite it as a truism, they do so relying upon its historical position rather 
than any evidence that counterspeech actually works. Counterspeech has become an 
 
110 Baranetsky, supra note 103, at 205–08. 
111 Id. 
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aphorism without justification. That does not mean that its proponents (both inside 
and outside the judiciary) are wrong in arguing that counterspeech is preferable to the 
alternatives, but they should at least engage with those who have valid critiques, 
particularly given the multidisciplinary nature of those critiques. In a sense, 
counterspeech is no longer just a political theory, but something that can be analyzed 
through a range of methods and in multiple disciplines. 
Third — and least likely — courts should incorporate some of these critiques in an 
active way to reshape the counterspeech doctrine. For the same reasons that courts 
should engage more fully with the criticisms of counterspeech, they should also 
consider modifying the doctrine. Counterspeech cannot, on its own, accomplish all the 
responsibilities that courts have placed upon it. It must work in tandem with other 
tools — most notably, regulation — to achieve the goals of the First Amendment, 
given the dynamics of public discourse. Given the unimpeded ascendancy of 
counterspeech over the last fifty years, this seems unlikely to happen — but it remains 
an option, even if an implausible one. 
The third reform is the most critical to both preserving counterspeech’s vitality and 
to promoting First Amendment values by moving away from a knee-jerk deregulatory 
response. Counterspeech is important in rebutting speech, but it cannot be the only 
tool in promoting the democratic values that the First Amendment is concerned with, 
particularly if counterspeech has a confusing mandate to begin with.  
Though it seems unlikely that counterspeech will be fully reconsidered by federal 
courts in the coming years, given how strongly it has come to dominate other, non-
legal settings, it deserves renewed attention. As counterspeech has been exported to 
new venues as a method of speech regulation, it is an appropriate moment to evaluate 
what different forms it takes in new applications. 
IV. COUNTERSPEECH OUTSIDE LAW 
This Part describes how counterspeech has been used to guide speech regulation 
outside of legal entities and encourages those entities that are adopting counterspeech 
to consider some of the criticisms described supra. Social media companies, the 
paradigmatic instance of a non-state public square, are the most obvious example of 
how counterspeech has leapt from courts to non-governmental entities. 
The speech adjudication regimes that large social media platforms have developed 
have been extensively studied by legal and non-legal academics alike.112 While an 
extensive discussion of the  platforms’ complex content moderation regimes is outside 
of the scope of this Article, many of the platforms have incorporated elements of 
American free speech law into their policies. Counterspeech is one of those elements. 
In discussing how platforms conceive of counterspeech, this Part seeks to explore 
how counterspeech is conceived of and operates in non-judicial venues (that are still 
heavily influenced by First Amendment doctrine). The discussion draws attention to 
how social media platforms, which partially rely upon counterspeech to govern 
content policy, should more carefully examine the evolution of the legal doctrine when 
 
112 See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 12; SIVA VAIDYANATHAN, ANTI-SOCIAL MEDIA: HOW 
FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY (2018). 
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justifying their own content choices.113 In doing so, they may also encourage courts to 
more explicitly engage with how counterspeech functions. 
A. Counterspeech and Content Moderation Policy 
Public engagement with platform content moderation policies has skyrocketed in 
recent years.114 There are multiple potential reasons for this increase, including the 
proliferation of technology platforms in everyday life, heightened political 
polarization, and higher awareness of content moderation policy through press reports 
and social media sharing itself. In recent years, a number of scholars have studied 
content moderation from a range of scholarly disciplines and perspectives.115 In 
general, such policies were developed by American attorneys with a background in 
First Amendment and U.S. media law.116 As such, they reflect the baselines and 
preferences of American attitudes towards free speech.117 
 
113 I take as a given that social media platforms seek consistency and predictability in their 
application of content rules, in a similar way to courts. Whether they do is debatable. Unlike 
government actors, which have to conform with the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 
social media platforms have no formal requirements to be consistent, accountable, transparent, 
or fair. Pressure from individuals, civil society, governmental entities, and competitors may 
promote fairness, accountability, and transparency, but only to the degree that platforms actually 
respond to such pressure. See The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability 
in Content Moderation, SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES, https://santaclaraprinciples.org 
[https://perma.cc/SJJ6-TG3G] (setting out core principles for platforms to adhere to regarding 
content moderation principles and decisions). 
114 See, e.g., Julia Jacobs, Will Instagram Ever “Free the Nipple”?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/arts/design/instagram-free-the-nipple.html 
[https://perma.cc/26C8-REED] (discussing Instagram’s ban on female nipples and the 
#freethenipple campaign supported by artists, activists, and celebrities); Liam Stack, What Is a 
‘Shadow Ban,’ and Is Twitter Doing It to Republican Accounts?, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/us/politics/twitter-shadowbanning.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q2X9-BJJ7] (describing the concept of “shadow banning” — modifying 
algorithms to de-emphasize certain accounts in listings — and Twitter’s denial that it did so for 
certain political views, despite allegations from conservatives). 
115 See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 12; Evelyn Douek, The Rise of Content Cartels, KNIGHT 
FIRST AMENDMENT INST. AT COLUM. UNIV. (Feb. 11, 2020), 
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/the-rise-of-content-cartels; SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE 
SCREEN: CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019). 
116 See Eric Johnson, Former Google Lawyer and Deputy U.S. CTO Nicole Wong on Recode 
Decode, VOX: RECODE (Sept. 12, 2018, 12:46 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/12/17848384/nicole-wong-cto-lawyer-google-twitter-kara-
swisher-decode-podcast-full-transcript [https://perma.cc/3YCZ-YNDB] (discussing Wong’s 
career from practicing media law to serving as a product counsel at Google). 
117 American platform companies also enjoy a broad range of immunity from liability for the 
posts of their users, thanks to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
While the protections of Section 230 do not explain all of the platforms’ moderation choices, 
Section 230 was designed to encourage good faith moderation tactics on the part of platforms, 
whether or not they comported with constitutional protections. Because of Section 230, platforms 
can generally rely upon user speech and counterspeech to flourish without concerns regarding 
potentially unlawful content being posted and creating intermediary liability for the platforms. 
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Central to this approach, as discussed supra, is the notion that “the only cure for 
bad speech is more speech.”118 Rather than have extensive moderation of user-
generated content or ex ante review, most of the major platforms like YouTube, 
Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram have adopted a model in which users are generally 
able to post content without prior review. This allows for both a decrease in oversight 
costs by the platforms and the possibility of widespread sharing or potential virality 
(depending on the platform’s architecture), all without much regulation or intervention 
by the platform itself.119 If they are marketplaces of ideas, they can often be boisterous 
or even cacophonous ones. 
Part of the concern regarding social media platforms comes from questions 
regarding their honesty. Do they in fact want to promote speech for societal benefits, 
or because doing so helps their bottom line? Does a reluctance to moderate speech 
stem from First Amendment principles — or because provocative speech promotes 
user engagement and minimizes moderation costs? Given how Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg now whitewashes his company’s history by claiming that the behemoth 
was born out of his desire to encourage debate and discussion regarding the Iraq 
War120 — rather than a juvenile attempt to rate the attractiveness of his female 
classmates121 — it is understandable that critics would be skeptical of platforms’ 
claims regarding their content moderation goals and motivations. Yet, even taking 
platforms at their word, one can see the shortcomings of their approach.  
While platforms have ever-mushrooming rules on what cannot be posted, they 
generally start from a place of allowance rather than restriction.122 Content is 
 
For further discussion of the origins and history of Section 230, see JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-
SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019). 
118 See supra Part I.  
119 For a discussion of different taxonomies of moderation, see James Grimmelmann, The 
Virtues of Moderation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 42, 55 (2015) (analyzing how different components 
of moderation play out in different online spaces). A Marxist critique of this model might observe 
that by outsourcing the labor to users to report unlawful or impermissible content, the platforms 
are abdicating part of their responsibility and requiring those with less power to 
disproportionately work to preserve the platforms’ capacity for discourse. 
120 Alex Horton, Iraq War Protests Inspired Facebook, Zuckerberg Says. A Lawmaker Who Was 
There Says That’s False., WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2019, 5:30 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/22/iraq-war-protests-inspired-facebook-
zuckerburg-says-lawmaker-who-was-there-says-thats-false/ [https://perma.cc/V8UV-7ZFF]. 
121 Alex Horton, Channeling ‘The Social Network,’ Lawmaker Grills Zuckerberg on His 




122 Part of the puzzle of content moderation is the juxtaposition between what platforms say 
they do regarding speech and what they actually do. While there is a permissive aspect to what 
speech gets posted, the largest platforms have extensive guides on what content is allowable and 
what is not. These restrictions have become ever more complicated over time. For further 
discussion, see Klonick, supra note 12, at 1631–35. While there are complicated restrictions on 
what content is impermissible (based on a variety of factors) that somewhat undercuts the 
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presumptively permissible — except when it isn’t allowed123 — and while it may be 
reported to the platform by users as possibly violative of law or policy, much of it 
remains accessible. Thus, when it comes to objectionable content, platforms (like 
American courts) seem to prefer to let counterspeech in the form of criticism, replies, 
and comments manage the dynamics of speech on the forum. 
This model, as many critics have noted, has its drawbacks. Speech online is quite 
different from speech in a physical, public space.124 Amplification and virality mean 
that speech spreads much more rapidly via online platforms than it might through 
traditional media like newspapers, television, and radio.125 The costs of creating 
coordinated misinformation campaigns are far lower.126 Architectural choices on the 
platform have consequences for how speech is promulgated, prioritized, and 
critiqued.127 Relying upon First Amendment doctrine to govern online spaces, 
therefore, cannot fill in all the gaps that divide the dynamics of speech online versus 
the dynamics of speech in person.128 
Platforms differ from the archetypal public space in structural, technology, and 
political ways. They enable speech in different ways, allowing speech to proliferate 
on orders of magnitude greater than existing spaces. As private entities, they are 
subject to far different constraints and concerns than governmental bodies. 
The harms that result — such as non-consensual sexual imagery, anti-Semitic 
tropes, and racist language — are similar to existing problems for free speech doctrine, 
but in a mutated manner. When the concerns involve private spaces rather than public 
 
perceived free-for-all nature of the platforms, there remains a baseline assumption from the 
perspective of the user that most content is permissible — as evidenced by the lack of prior 
review before a user can click “Post” or “Upload” or “Tweet” or “Share.” 
123 Image hashing is one method of preventing images from being posted or flagging them for 
review, if they fall into certain unwanted or illegal categories such as terrorist propaganda or 
child exploitative imagery. The content is analyzed against an existing corpus of content and 
compared, either as being identical content or falling into a similar category. Then, depending on 
the platform’s design and policies, it can be blocked from posting or flagged. See, e.g., Robert 
Gorwa et al., Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the 
Automation of Platform Governance, 7 BIG DATA & SOC. 1 (2020) (describing technical design 
and applications for algorithmic content moderation). 
124 See, e.g., KOSSEFF, supra note 117, at 36–56 (describing the differences between speech in 
an analog world and speech on the nascent Internet platforms of CompuServe and Prodigy in the 
1990s, and resulting differences for intermediary liability). 
125 See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, Can Democracy Survive the Internet?, 28 J. DEMOCRACY 64, 
70 (2017). 
126 Id. at 67. 
127 See, e.g., Soraya Chemaly, Fake News and Online Harassment Are More Than Social 
Media Byproducts — They’re Powerful Profit Drivers, SALON (Dec. 17, 2016), 
https://www.salon.com/control/2016/12/17/fake-news-and-online-harassment-are-more-than-
social-media-byproducts-theyre-powerful-profit-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/7B24-J8DL]. 
128 This brief summary necessarily elides many of the other distinctions between governmental 
restrictions on speech and private entities’ restrictions on speech, especially the concerns relating 
to the power of the state to limit dissent. 
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squares, and the political and social ramifications of content management implicate 
different legal concerns than governmental censorship, classic approaches to free 
speech cannot be uncritically imported to platforms. 
What does this mean for counterspeech? If courts and individual citizens have 
turned away from “the search for truth” justification, how and why should online 
platforms conceive of counterspeech?129 And additionally, given that private 
companies have a different kind of power as compared to the state, why should we 
have a similar preference for counterspeech on a private platform as we do in a public 
space?130 
Answers to these questions are the subject of books and require extensive 
interdisciplinary analysis to uncover. A narrow focus on how counterspeech functions 
on the platforms reveals two observations: 
• The use of counterspeech as a guideline for content moderation is justified 
by reference to a framework informed by First Amendment doctrine, but it is 
unclear why counterspeech is preferable to other forms of speech regulation 
(particularly given the differences between governmental and corporate 
power). 
• Many platforms employ counterspeech as an implicit content moderation 
scheme, in part because of its centrality in First Amendment doctrine, but 
often to avoid platform intervention in defining acceptable speech rather than 
because counterspeech helps orient public discourse towards truth. 
Both these observations run parallel to the discussion in Part III, supra, regarding 
how courts conceive of counterspeech. Courts employ functionalist justifications for 
invalidating laws on free speech grounds where counterspeech might plausibly play a 
role instead.131 While the platforms have developed a more sophisticated and 
complicated version of content regulation over time, counterspeech remains a core 
principle.132 In general, there are not broad ex ante prohibitions (which, if they existed, 
would be akin to government regulation) on what users can post. 
 
129 Commissioner Ellen Weintraub, of the Federal Election Commission, observed that 
platforms that rely upon microtargeting may create an environment impervious to 
counterspeech, given that not all members of the marketplace may be even aware of certain 
ideas that they would want to counter. See Ellen L. Weintraub, Opinion, Don’t Abolish Political 
Ads on Social Media. Stop Microtargeting., WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019, 6:51 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/01/dont-abolish-political-ads-social-
media-stop-microtargeting/ [https://perma.cc/9FY8-3RUL]. 
130 One aspect of the dominance of American companies in the digital economy is the lack of 
alternate conceptions of speech (such as the quite different European framework) in developing 
content moderation strategies. 
131 See supra Section IV.A. 
132 One important distinction exists when comparing judicial invalidation of government 
regulation of speech when counterspeech exists as an alternative, and the platforms’ implicit 
reliance on counterspeech as opposed to developing ex ante guidelines — the platform operates 
as both legislator and judge. This may demonstrate a more holistic, consistent view towards the 
relevance of counterspeech on platforms, given that those who draft the content moderation 
guidelines can anticipate how they will be adjudicated, as the same entity does both. The creation 
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There are many rational reasons for platforms to rely upon counterspeech rather 
than ex ante restrictions. If platforms are to fulfill their intended function of connecting 
individuals, too many prior restraints on speech would undercut that goal. Like 
governmental entities, platforms struggle with how to effectively draft restrictions on 
speech that are sufficiently well-tailored to keep unwanted speech out but don’t block 
acceptable speech.133 The scale of posting on the largest profiles is almost impossible 
to prescreen through human review. Automated screening of speech currently exists 
in very limited situations and would be difficult to realistically deploy on a broad 
scale.134 The issue is not whether counterspeech works or is effective, but whether, 
how, and why companies are choosing to rely on it in regulating their speech venues 
— and whether their public rationales are consistent with their business motivations.  
B. Changing Platform Counterspeech 
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court made an intentional choice in 
shifting away from a system in which the First Amendment was a “dead letter” to one 
in which courts more robustly enforced civil liberties protections, using counterspeech 
as a partial justification for that move — even though the role of counterspeech shifted 
over time from a search for truth to an alternative to regulation. By contrast, social 
media platforms have seemingly relied upon counterspeech to support content 
moderation policies not through an intentional choice, but rather through a de facto 
analogization to existing American free speech law.  
While this is understandable given that most of the major social media platforms 
are American companies staffed by American lawyers, that choice (or non-choice) has 
 
of Facebook’s Oversight Board may complicate this dynamic. For further discussion of the 
history and intended function of the Oversight Board, see Kate Klonick, The Facebook Oversight 
Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression, 129 YALE 
L.J. 2232 (2020). 
133 One of the most high-profile examples of this dilemma involved the posting of the famous 
“Napalm Girl” photograph, taken by an Associate Press photographer during the Vietnam War. 
The Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph depicts children fleeing a napalm attack; one, a nine-year-
old girl, was naked. Facebook employees chose to remove the photo as violative of its policies, 
though critics noted that its newsworthiness and renown justified its posting. Eventually, the 
decision was reversed after global backlash. Facebook noted that “context” was crucial to 
determining what content was permissible, which demonstrates the limitations of automated 
content moderation and the classic legal dilemma of “rules vs. standards” which content 
moderation exemplifies. See Aarti Shahani, With ‘Napalm Girl,’ Facebook Humans (Not 
Algorithms) Struggle To Be Editor, NPR (Sept. 10, 2016, 11:12 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/09/10/493454256/with-napalm-girl-
facebook-humans-not-algorithms-struggle-to-be-editor [https://perma.cc/MPF4-892N]; see also 
Klonick, supra note 12, at 1631–35 (describing the evolution of Facebook’s content policies 
“from standards to rules”). 
134 See, e.g., Natasha Duarte et al., Mixed Messages: The Limits of Automated Social Media 
Content Analysis, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HGZ5-69Q7] 
(discussing how automated social media content analysis fall short of the desired applications of 
those tools. Depending on the context, some automated content notices — such as those targeting 
COVID-19 misinformation — may seem effective, but much depends on how these frameworks 
are designed.). 
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had massive repercussions given the global scale of the platforms.135 Moreover, both 
of the main judicial justifications for counterspeech — that it helps to lead society to 
the truth or that it is preferable to regulation — might also be relevant for platforms, 
but those justifications are rarely discussed or acknowledged.136 Instead, the platforms 
seem to justify the existence of harmful speech with instrumentalist or accountability 
theories — that they, in general, don’t want to be in the position of making choices 
about user speech. Those theories, of course, also support their business models of 
having as large a user base as possible.  
Counterspeech might be the best option for platforms given the alternatives. But 
given the importance of content moderation policy to shaping public discourse, there 
should be greater examination of why it is the best choice — either because of 
ambivalence about platform controls over speech or because it helps society discover 
the truth, or for some other reason. How counterspeech works on platforms remains 
another challenge, given that comments and critiques may not be placed on the same 
level as the original content. Defaulting to counterspeech absent any interrogation as 
to why it works best for the platforms benefits no one.  
The public lacks an understanding of what theories undergird the platforms’ 
approach to content management.137 The platforms lack the ability to coherently 
 
135 The First Amendment has a capacious view of free speech almost unparalleled in other 
democratic nations; when contrasting the American free speech tradition against European 
norms, the differences are quite stark. However, there does seem to be a growing recognition that 
non-American perspectives on free speech are relevant given the global nature of many 
platforms. See Tiffany Li, Intermediaries & Private Speech Regulation: A Transatlantic 
Dialogue, INFO. SOC. PROJECT (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/isp/documents/private_speech_reg_workshop
_report_3.12.19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2X3N-SSX3] (describing the changing nature of platform 
regulation and the importance of including non-American and non-Western perspectives). 
136 Mark Zuckerberg has argued that Facebook shouldn’t be in the position of deciding truth, 
though the platform (like all platforms) necessarily has to make difficult calls on content. See, 
e.g., Salvador Rodriguez, Mark Zuckerberg Says Social Networks Should Not Be Fact-Checking 
Political Speech, CNBC (May 28, 2020, 7:05 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/28/zuckerberg-facebook-twitter-should-not-fact-check-
political-speech.html [https://perma.cc/8XVX-UGYA]. The disconnect between the public 
statements of company leaders and the actual practices of the platforms makes the problem even 
more difficult to address, and the role of counterspeech ever more contested. 
In the United States, the rise of misinformation connected to both COVID-19 and the 2020 
presidential election demonstrates how social media platforms must balance their own desires to 
host as much information as possible against public health or democratic legitimacy concerns. 
As companies are not courts, they did not need to explain those decisions, so we have less insight 
as to why those companies felt the counterspeech strategy was insufficient to address those issues.  
137 At one point, Twitter was described as being “the free speech wing of the free speech party,” 
a slogan that the site eventually moved away from. Whether or not it was ever an accurate 
description, it was at least cognizable as a policy framework that could be discussed and critiqued. 
See Josh Halliday, Twitter's Tony Wang: 'We Are the Free Speech Wing of the Free Speech 
Party,’ GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2012/mar/22/twitter-
tony-wang-free-speech [https://perma.cc/NG6L-Z43Z] (ascribing this view to Twitter’s CEO 
and general counsel); see also Chloe Hadavas, What Twitter Should Have Done Differently From 
the Very Beginning, SLATE (May 29, 2020, 11:01 AM), 
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explain or justify their choices, instead relying upon pithy statements that sit in tension 
with ever-ballooning exceptions and limitations. Despite relying upon counterspeech 
to explain their content moderation policies, platforms also fail to engage with how 
counterspeech’s justification has evolved over time. Just as courts should more 
explicitly describe how and why counterspeech functions as a guideline for 
understanding free speech, so too should platforms more directly describe how they 
conceive of counterspeech and why it is preferred above alternatives.  
There are pragmatic reasons beyond intellectual consistency and transparency for 
platforms to better articulate why they rely upon counterspeech and what it is intended 
to do. Both users and government entities are increasingly focused on how platforms 
manage content.138 Calls for changes to Section 230,139 which are aimed at changing 
how platforms manage content, would likely change how counterspeech functions as 
part of those platforms’ speech policies. Given that frustration with the platforms is 
the rare topic to achieve bipartisan consensus, it seems possible that regulatory 
changes could mandate unwilling changes for content moderation. The platforms will 
need to make their best case for why their approach works. If counterspeech is to 
remain part of their framework, platforms must do a better job of articulating why they 
rely upon it and to what ends. And if they cannot, they should more explicitly repudiate 
or modify their easy and expedient reliance on counterspeech. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite its muddled history, counterspeech is almost certainly here to stay. The 
courts show little appetite for revisiting the doctrine. Private U.S. entities have 
internalized First Amendment jurisprudence to such a degree that counterspeech 
seems similarly ensconced within their content policies. Changing the trajectory of 
counterspeech might be like reorienting an ocean liner.  
In the judicial setting, the shifting and vague nature of counterspeech must change. 
Courts should better articulate what counterspeech is, why it matters, and what it is 
designed to accomplish. A lack of specificity in analyses of counterspeech has led to 
an unfortunate accretion of confusion regarding counterspeech. Courts would do well 
to clear up this confusion when they invoke counterspeech and not treat it as a silver 
bullet that is inherently preferable in addressing problems that governments have 
sought to regulate. 
For private entities, relying on counterspeech without explanation — or as a 
shortcut for more expensive, more challenging, or more difficult choices — will only 
compound the confusion and frustration that abounds. With reform to Section 230 
 
https://slate.com/technology/2020/05/twitter-trump-blaine-cook.html [https://perma.cc/QQ5E-
BX6V] (describing how Twitter’s speech policies have changed over time and whether the “free 
speech wing of the free speech party” still applies to its content moderation approach). 
138 See, e.g., Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-
interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona [https://perma.cc/6NJ9-AZFZ] (describing the 
challenges of content moderation on Facebook and the psychological implications suffered by 
some moderators); Anna Wiener, Trump, Twitter, Facebook, and the Future of Online Speech, 
NEW YORKER (July 6, 2020) (discussing recent political critiques of Internet platforms and the 
case for modifying Section 230 in order to more effectively regulate speech). 
139 Weiner, supra note 138. 
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more likely than ever,140 social media platforms will have to better articulate why their 
counterspeech-reliant approach to content moderation works effectively, in order to 
preserve the status quo under federal law. A more forthcoming and robust response to 
why counterspeech is so central to content moderation policies will only improve the 
policy discussions surrounding platform regulation and the ways in which speech is 
expressed online.  
Counterspeech will always be an incomplete answer to speech we dislike. It cannot 
work alone to solve social problems. It cannot accomplish all the goals we have 
freighted upon it over the past century. It cannot be the only solution we speak of when 
we are confronted with “speech we hate.” Only by being transparent about what we 
hope for from counterspeech — its strengths, its limitations, and its purposes — can 































140 See Matt Laslo, The Fight over Section 230—And the Internet as We Know It, WIRED (Aug. 
13, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/ 
[https://perma.cc/MM4Z-Z6QP]. For detailed discussion of common Section 230 reform issues, 
see, for example, Daphne Keller, Six Constitutional Hurdles for Platform Speech Regulation, 
STAN. L. SCH.: THE CTR. FOR INTERNET AND SOC’Y (Jan. 22, 2021, 6:49 AM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/01/six-constitutional-hurdles-platform-speech-
regulation [https://perma.cc/J2C6-MG4J]. 
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